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Abstract 
The gift from an anthropological perspective differs from the rigid civil notion of donation, which presupposes an unilateral, 
gratuitous transfer from one person to another. The anthropological notion of the gift includes all gratuitous transfers, either 
material or non-material. Therefore, the relation between the anthropological notion of the gift and the legal notion of donation is 
one of inclusion. However, limitations imposed on donations in Roman law follow the same logic of the legal limitations on 
other gratuitous transfers such as the ones prohibited by leges sumptuaria. In this article I will analyze the reasons behind the 
legal interdictions in Roman law on some gratuitous spending, including donations between spouses, the ones prohibited by Lex 
cincia de donis et muneribus and by leges sumptuaria, interdictions that deal with the anthropological function of the gift in the 
greco-roman world. 
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1. The function of the gift in Roman culture 
The gift, theorized by Marcel Mauss, from an anthropological perspective, is any transfer that is apparently for 
free, voluntary and unilateral, but is in fact mandatory, interested and bilateral. In his central work in anthropology, 
Essai sur le don. Forme et raison de l'échange dans les sociétés archaïques, from 1926, Mauss concludes that the 
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gift is subjected to a triple obligation - to give, to receive and to reciprocate, which also applies to gift in the ancient 
Roman culture, to which he dedicated a series of analyses (Mauss, 1993, p. 38). 
In Roman culture, of a society deeply stratified and marked by the importance given to acquiring recognition and 
avoidance of losing honour (Barton, 2001), gifts and donations took place throughout the whole society, fulfilling 
various functions at social, political and economic level. As Paul Veyne noticed, every social category would benefit 
from gifts - the poor were accepting charitable gifts, either as clients, or as free citizens, the slaves were benefitting 
from the gifts offered by virtue of the philanthropic spirit of their masters, the peasants working the lands of the 
owners were enjoying giving up a part of their duties towards the owner in exchange for staying on his property, the 
lawyers, since their activity wasn't recognized as a profession and were denied the request of payment, were 
receiving gifts from clients in the form of honorarium (Veyne, 1990, p. 5-6). This vision of gift relations, that were 
infiltrated in all dimensions of society are confirmed by Cicero (De Officiis, I, XVII) and Seneca (De Beneficiis, 
I,IV), who argued that gift relations were the binder of Roman society.  
Although, from the beginning of the Empire, making gifts to the Roman state was a privilege reserved only to the 
emperor, the cities and municipalities from the empire continued to receive gifts from the nobility of Rome (the 
senatorial order), from the local nobility (the equestrian order) or from the notables who were joining the ranks of 
municipal nobility (the decurial order) (Veyne, 1990, p. 5-6).   
Following this continuous stream of gifts in the Roman world, a fist distinction is required, which we shall take 
from the classical Latin, where the terms dona and munera designated different types of gifts (Hyland, 2009, p. 25). 
Munus referred to that category of gifts considered mandatory, after the Greek model, that were offered in certain 
public holidays or festivals (Cicero, De Officiis, II, XVI-XVII). Also, in this category were included the rewards for 
certain services that were deemed not to be carried for compensation, such as games, banquets and public works, 
which increased the prestige of the one organizing them (Cicero, De Officiis, II, VII). On the other hand, donum 
represented a more general category, of the gifts offered spontaneously among people with the role of starting or 
maintaining a social connection (Davies & Fouracre, 2010, p. 117). 
The disposal through donations in the form of munus played a central role in Roman culture, especially in the 
aristocratic life, both during the Republic and the Empire, where, through the disposal of generous donations the 
public support was obtained from the plebeians, the gift having an instrumental function in obtaining political 
legitimacy, fulfilling the same role as gifts in the Greek polis described by Aristotle in Politics. Plutarch recounts the 
life of Caesar, who, in order to advance in his political career, organized sumptuous public celebrations, whose 
funding was supported by a series of burdensome loans.    
Similar to the mandatory Greek gifts from the elite to the demos, from the Classical and Hellenistic periods, 
marked by economic shortages, during the Roman Principality period the gifts to the plebeians had a precise social 
function, of preventing riots and relaxing social tensions - in Rome, to the 200000 unemployed plebeians the bread 
was provided by public subsidies (Ciucă, 1998, Vol. I, p. 23). Towards the end of the Empire, the public service, due 
to the excessive gifts that were expected from those who intended to exercise it, quite often would ruin the officials. 
Besides, as early as the classical period, Roman law was recognizing the unilateral promise as source of obligations 
in the case of a pollicitatio, which consisted in the unilateral promise made to a citadel, valid only for cause admitted 
by the legal custom, such as the election in a magistracy or other public position and under the condition of 
acquiring that magistracy or position (Jakotă, 2002, p. 329-330).  
Regarding the function of the gift as an instrument in managing power relations between individuals, the same 
use of the gift in creating clientele relations, originating in the Greek ancient period, in the form of evergesia, is to 
be found in a similar manner in the Roman culture, in the form of patronage.  
The rule of offering a gift of equivalent value in exchange for the gift received is common to the Greco-Roman 
world, the inability to respond with an equivalent gift being the necessary ingredient to establishing a relation of 
subordination - it's the case of both artists, who precisely due to the inability to respond through a symmetrical gift 
accept the patronage, by which living expenses and audience are provided, and of the governors appointed by the 
emperor, who cannot offer in return gifts that would compensate their appointment (Crook, 2013, p. 67-69).  
This asymmetrical gift symbolically compensated, the gift being one of generosity, and the donor gaining 
recognition, prestige or the appreciation of the gratified, is, however, one of establishing a relation of subordination 
between the two. The relation of patronage, based on the difference in status between the donor and the donee or on 
the impossibility of returning an equivalent gift, although puts into play the same ingredients - recognition, 
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reciprocity, respect, honour - is fundamentally different from a relation of friendship, between equals. As Zeba 
Crook noticed, continuing Mauss' intuition, the asymmetrical gift uses only the language of gratuity to create an 
appearance of symmetry and friendship (Crook, 2013, p. 66-67).  
The acceptance of patronage is, therefore, different in the Greco-Roman world from the acceptance of gifts, 
assuming the inequality in status of the participants and instituting a relation of dependence. The language of 
friendship, used in the patron-client relation, signified the offering and acceptance of gifts between individuals with 
an equal status (isotês). Even though the relations between unequals also involved profound feelings of affection, 
loyalty and respect, such as the one between parent and child, the friendship relation was based especially on the 
equality of status, out of which reciprocity derived (charis), the equality of livelihood implying the possibility to 
return an equivalent gift (Crook, 2013, p. 66). 
Despite the central role that gifts were occupying in the Roman social and political life, the Roman philosophers 
were regarding these practices with suspicion - since the donations lacked the rationality of exchange, Cicero, in De 
officiis, reminds his son the virtue of moderation in the disposition by donations, which can lead to the waste of 
wealth and indebtedness, alluding to the rise to power of Julius Caesar (De Officiis, II, 19.VI). Another important 
representative of the Stoic philosophy, from the late period, Marcus Aurelius, nearly a century and a half after the 
Ciceronian warnings regarding the manipulative gift, will resume the critique of using gifts as a means to obtain 
prestige, for moral reasons (Marcus Aurelius, 2013, p. 231). 
2. The gift in Roman law 
In the analysis of the gift in Roman culture, we included in the sphere of the notion of gift both the operation of 
the donation in the legal sense and the gratuitous unilateral services, regardless of the effect they have on the 
patrimony of the giver. In Roman law, especially in the archaic and classical periods, it is estimated that donations 
were generally viewed unfavourably, since they were diminishing the patrimony of the giver (Zimmermann, 1996, 
p. 482). Besides, the legal operation of donation didn't originally have a form of its own, Roman law recognizing 
several categories of gratuitous transfers - the inter vivos donation, the dower, the ante nuptias donation, the one 
between spouses and the mortis causa one. 
During ancient and classical periods of the Roman law it was applicable the fundamental principle ex nudo pacto 
actio non nascitur (Digesta, XV, I, 49, 2), according to which the agreement of the parties, consensus, and the 
formal expression of the convention are not sufficient for the valid transfer of property, who had to take the form of 
a modus (Ciucă, 1998, Vol. I, p. 259-260). Until Emperor Theodosius II, who, in 428, made the dowry agreement 
mandatory, regardless of its form, and, later, Justinian, who recognized the validity of the donation agreement 
(Hanga & Bob, 2011, p. 259), it wasn't recognized under a form of its own, jus civile (jus Quiritium, the archaic law 
of Rome) imposing that the transfer of ownership, of a res private from cedens to accipiens, regardless of whether it 
was for free or for consideration, was to be done in the form of mancipatio or in jure cessio. The donations could 
also take the form of traditio, a non-formalist way of acquiring property, unsanctioned by jus civile, but protected by 
jus praetorium, or they could be made by some ways of creating or extinguishing obligations, such as sponsio and 
stipulatio.     
The donation was part of those agreements (pactum) that, concluded by the parties, only because they weren't 
respecting any form consecrated by Roman law, couldn't be recognized unless the parties were executing their 
obligations. For the donation pact to gain the status of a contract was necessary its recognition by Roman norms, the 
rule ex nudo pacto actio non nascitur being applicable even in the time of Justinian. However, the formalistic rule 
was attenuated in this era by three categories of pacts exempted from formalism - the legitimate pacts, the Praetorian 
ones and the accessory agreements.  
The imperial constitutions in the Roman post-classical era recognized legal effects to some pacts that were valid 
only in the sense of some legitimate agreements, such legitimate pacts being dictio dotis, recognized by Emperor 
Theodosius II, and the pact of donation, recognized by Justinian. 
The donation represented the legitimate pact by which the donor transfers irrevocably and free of charge an asset 
to the accepting donee. Unlike the free contracts comodatus and mandatum, the donation involved a depletion of the 
donor with the purpose of enriching the done (Digesta, XXXIX, V, 1 pr.). The donations were distinguished by the 
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inter vivos character from the mortis causa agreements, although in Institutiones are also mentioned the mortis 
causa donations, which were assimilated, though, with legacies (Institutiones, II, VII, 2).     
The donation agreement implied the meeting of two conditions - animus donandi, by which the donor was 
intentionally making a liberality without following a consideration, and the acceptance by the donee of the liberality 
(Digesta, XXXIX, V, 19.2). 
 
3. Legal limitations on donations between spouses 
A form of inter vivos donation is the one between spouses which has a particular legal status, subjected to certain 
specific restrictions. The donations between spouses was possible only in the case of the sine manu marriage which, 
unlike the cum manu marriage, implied a legal separation of the spouses’ patrimonies. Therefore, the sine manu 
married woman was the only one who could have exerted the legal prerogatives of her goods’ property rights. She 
was able to contract even with her husband during the entire Classical period, except donations which were 
recognized later, in the Principality period (Ciucă, 1998, Vol. I, p. 197-198). 
The interdiction of donations between spouses was in force in roman Roman law until 206 when the emperor 
Antoninus Caracalla recognized the donation between spouses in Oration Antonini senatus-consult. The donation in 
these conditions would have been valid only in the case of donor’s persistence until death in his intention to donate 
(Molcuț, 2011, p. 328). This condition is to be found also in modern civil codes which recognize the possibility of 
donation revocation between spouses: art. 937 (1) of the Romanian Civil Code of 1865 – Any donation among 
spouses during marriage is revocable, and also art. 1096 (1) of Napoleon’s Code – Toutes donations faites entre 
époux pendant le marriage, quoique qualifies entre vifs, seront toujours révocables (Ciucă, 2000, p. 881).  
The distrust by which Roman law considered donations among spouses was grounded especially on the 
patrimonial consequences such acts had on the patrimonies of the spouses. In Justinian’s Digesta, Liber XXIV, 
Titulus 1, De donationibus inter virum et uxorem, there are specified certain reasons for this interdiction: Ulpian 
suggested that it has the purpose of preventing the squandering of the wealth on extravagant gifts among spouses 
and Paulus, reffering to the reason of Sextus Caecillius, remarked that if the husband would have had the possibility 
to donate but for some reasons he wouldn’t have, this would give a venalicia character to the marriage, transforming 
it into an object to be gained through gifts competition between the husband and other suitors. In this case the 
matrimonial arrangements would consider especially the capability of the future husbands to make such gifts, 
turning the marriage into a mercantile affair. This reason is developed by Ulpian who refers to Emperor Antoninus 
who considered that the interdiction of the ancestors of the donation between spouses was grounded in considering 
the marriage an union founded on honest mutual sentiments, whose prestige would suffer in the case of a material 
interest. In this case the donation among spouses would have a negative effect since it would excessively enrich the 
one who would have a material interest on the expense of the other. 
We can clearly see that the interdiction was not grounded only on patrimonial reasons, but also on moral aspects 
as well, who take into account the role of the gift in the public life of Roman society. Plutarch, as an external 
observer, explains this interdiction (Plutarch, Moralia, Quaestiones Romanae, 7,265) starting like Ulpian from the 
patrimonial aspects, suggesting that the Roman interdiction was inspired from the Laws of Solon from Athena, 
which invalidated the wills perfected under the influence of the wife, considering the husband’s predisposition to be 
manipulated by his wife.  
The second reason for the interdiction Plutarch gives takes into account the relationship among spouses – since 
the gift was used in Roman society even among strangers, it becomes an irrelevant sign of affection between 
spouses, and even more, the implicit manipulative function, governed by the Maussian triple obligation, could 
obstruct the possibility of gratuitous expressions of affection between spouses. Also Plutarch refers to the role of the 
gift as means for strangers to seduce wives, becoming per a contrario an inappropriate mean for a husband who 
should rely on his wife’s affection regardless of the gifts she receives from him. The seduction of wives by other 
men through gifts was possible since the sine manu wife had her own patrimony and also the possibility of 
perfecting contracts such as receiving gifts from strangers. The manipulative power the gifts had was amplified by 
the absence of any legal obligation of fidelity, imposed only through Lex Julia de adulteriis by Emperor Augustus in 
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18. Until then the sine manu wife would have enjoyed the freedom to live in a different place than her husband’s 
domus (Ciucă, 1998, Vol. I, p. 197).  
Inspite the apparently free gifts used in the public sphere in order to gain power, prestige, influence or acces to a 
political career, in fact governed by the Maussian triple obligation, the private sphere was still centered on the ideal 
of gratuity. Therefore, the affection among spouses was not something to be obtained through gifts, as a response 
expected from the gratified by the donor. The legal interdiction of donations between spouses was the manner in 
which Roman law sought to protect the relations between spouses from the invasive gift-relations governed by the 
Maussian rules, relations which were ubiquous in the public sphere. The purpose was to protect the family from the 
reciprocal gift, the gift as pharmakon (with the double meaning of cure and poison), which was typical of the public 
sphere.  
4. The restrictions on gifts by leges sumptuaria 
As we saw in analyzing the donation between spouses, the restrictive measures gifts were subjected to in Roman 
society, although they were grounded in preventing the negative effects it would have on the patrimony of the donor, 
they also took into account other extra-patrimonial aspects, such as the independence of certain categories of 
persons or some social values, threatened by the manipulative function of the gift. 
Not only donations among individuals were subjected to legal restrictions, but also the general category of munus 
– the collective gifts which consisted of public works, banquets, festivals and public ceremonies which were 
financed by the wealthy elite. These forms of collective gifts were means by which members of the Roman 
aristocracy competed with each other in gaining prestige in publicly displaying their social status. These gifts were 
governed by the Maussian triple obligation: every member of the elite was obliged by his status to give or accept 
such gifts, simultaneously accepting the position of the indebted which obliged them to respond in return with a new 
gift. The taste for rivalry would have drawn in the spiral of such gifts extravagant amounts of wealth, since the 
purpose was to gain status confirmation or the superiority on the other.  
In the time of Republic and at the beginning of the Empire some laws were passed, leges sumptuariae, with the 
explicit purpose of limiting the excessive spending on this lavish collective gifts. The object of these laws consisted 
in a wide range of spending, from the ones needed for organizing banquets, the food that was served and the 
maximum number of guests, to the ones for clothes, funerary decorations and means of transportation as signs of 
social status (Miles, 1987, p. 10). The Roman moralists were supporting these restrictions since their critique had the 
wasteful spending and extravagance as well as the ostentative display of social status of the Roman aristocracy as 
targets. Leges sumptuaria explicitly appealed to the ancient virtues, mores maiorum, virtum and their purpose was to 
protect individuals’ patrimonies from wasting on this extravagant gift competition.  
Lex Claudia de navibus senatoribus from 218 B.C. and an year later Lex Metilia de fullonibus were succeded by 
Lex Oppia, which contained restrictions regarding clothing, jewelry and means of transportation for women, and a 
number of nine laws were passed to limit the spending on banquets. The restriction regarding lux mensae, both in 
public and private spheres, was continued by Lex Fannia from 161 B.C., which imposed sanctions both on the host 
and on the guests, and its territorial reach was expanded to the whole Italic territory through Lex Didia in 143 B.C. 
(Dari-Mattiacci & Plisecka, 2010, p. 6). 
All these laws were passed during the Republic, a time when the economic and political supremacy of the 
senatorial order was threaten by the rise of the equestrian order, which profited from the Roman expansion during 
the last two centuries. In this period the senatorial order which had all the political power lost a part of the economic 
power in favor of the equestrian order, and during the Empire lost its political power also in the favor of the 
princeps. In this context the restrictions imposed by laws to donations and all other gratuitous spending by leges 
sumptuaria, in spite of the reasons regarding the protection of the patrimony and the constant reference to the 
ancient virtue can be explained in a different perspective, from the point of view of the central role prestige and 
honor played in Roman aristocratic life. What seemed from the point of view of the law as an irrational waste of 
wealth on material objects and extremely onerous gratuities caused by moral decadence of that time can be 
explained through the rivalry, the competition between the groups for social status and public recognition (Miles, 
1987, p. 94-95). 
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From this perspective, the legal limitations with the explicit purpose of protecting the generous from the negative 
effects of their own liberalities, doubled by the reference to ancient virtues, can be understood as protective 
measures for those who, for various reasons, were not so eager to make such gifts. The law had this purpose also, to 
stop the transformation of these extravagant gifts in an unavoidable social practice for someone who wanted to keep 
his social status. Just as the interdiction of donations between spouses was imposed in order to protect the husband 
from competing with other suitors for his wife, so did leges sumptuaria for the senatorial order: since this category 
of Roman aristocracy couldn’t afford to compete in extravagant spending with the new elite of the equestrian order 
anymore, leges sumptuaria had a protective role for the social status of the senatorial order. The senatorial order that 
was the only one that had both the political and economic power, in order to distinguish themselves from the poor, 
including the equestrian order, used the collective gifts as signs of wealth. This practice was too onerous to be 
copied by other members of the Roman society. Along with the economic growth of the equestrian order, the public 
display of wealth by means of collective gifts were the only means of signaling the social status and of gaining 
recognition. Since the equestrian order accumulated wealth through trade, and not having properties around Rome, 
they used the extravagant spending in order to signal their status. The purpose of leges sumptuaria was to limit the 
access of this new elite to the means of signaling social status and gaining public recognition the senatorial order, 
who lost its economic power, couldn’t afford anymore (Miles, 1987, p. 16-20). 
Banquets played a major role in displaying one’s wealth and social connections – the guests would take part in a 
festivity which would take a couple of days and which was the perfect opportunity for the host to display his wealth, 
friends, and tastes. Other kinds of collective gifts and public spending like financially supporting the public games 
or every-day gifts to the poor, although more onerous at times than banquets, didn’t have the same exclusivist value 
as the latter. The sanctions imposed by law to hosts and guests only increased the exclusivity of these events which 
represented the most important means of displaying social status and for these particular reasons the restrictions 
imposed by leges sumptuaria were rarely applied (Dari-Mattiacci & Plisecka, 2010, p. 2-6). 
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